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Abstract
In this paper, we study resource allocation games of two different cost com-
ponents for individual game players and various social costs. The total cost of
each individual player consists of the congestion cost, which is the same for all
players sharing the same resource, and resource activation cost, which is pro-
portional to the individual usage of the resource. The social costs we consider
are, respectively, the total of costs of all players and the maximum congestion
cost plus total resource activation cost.
Using the social costs we assess the quality of Nash equilibria in terms of the
price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). For each problem, we
identify one or two problem parameters and provide parametric bounds on the
PoA and PoS. We show that they are unbounded in general if the parameters
involved are not restricted.
Keywords: resource allocation game, congestion cost, cost-sharing, price of
anarchy, price of stability
1 Introduction
Problems of resource allocation often involve decentralized decision making. A typ-
ical example is, in terms of machine scheduling, allocation of machines to jobs (or
assignment of jobs to machines) in which selfish agents, representing individual jobs,
select machines for processing their own jobs. In the long run, decisions of the agents,
motivated by individual interests, usually result in a Nash equilibrium (NE) at which
no individual agent will benefit from any unilateral deviation for the current resource
allocation. In terms of a given social objective, such an equilibrium is not necessar-
ily, indeed, can often be far from optimal. It is important, therefore, to analyze the
quality of NE solutions in terms of social optimality.
The resource allocation games we consider in this paper are as follows. Given a
set of jobs, each of which has a positive weight and is controlled by a selfish agent.
Each agent decides on which of the identical machines available to assign his job to.
We consider two game models: the load balancing model and the proportional cost
sharing model.
∗Corresponding author: Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL,
United Kingdom. b.chen@warwick.ac.uk
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In the load balancing game, the cost of each agent is caused by a congestion,
which is defined as the load of the machine, i.e., the sum of weights of the jobs
assigned to it. This is the classical load balancing game as described in [15] and
has been studied extensively as can be seen below. Our second game model is a
generalization of the first, in which there are unlimited number of identical machines
available, but usage of each machine comes with an additional set-up or activation
cost, which is proportionally shared by all agents who assign their jobs to the machine
according to the job weights. This model is recently introduced and studied in [8].
Therefore, in this model, each agent pays both the common congestion cost and the
shared activation cost.
While cost functions of individual game players are the same as in those studies
already existed in the literature, in our study of the aforementioned two models, we
consider different social objectives in our assessment of the quality of NE solutions.
For the load balancing model, our social objective is to minimize the total of individ-
ual players’ congestion costs, which is also the total of machine loads. The rational
of this social objective is that all jobs on a machine are released in a batch at the
same time after the last job is finished. Hence, all agents who have assigned their
jobs to the same machine will get their jobs done at the same time. Since this social
cost gives the total time spent in the system by all jobs, it is closely related to the
work-in-process inventory for the system. On the other hand, for the proportional
cost-sharing model, we consider two different social costs: the total of congestion
costs and activation costs; and the maximum congestion cost plus total activation
costs.
As in any other games, the social cost of an NE solution in the resource allocation
games is often not minimum, whose corresponding solutions are called optimal. In
this paper, we use the commonly accepted notions of the price of anarchy (PoA) and
the price of stability (PoS) to analyze the quality of NE solutions. As introduced
by Papadimitriou in [13], the PoA (respectively, PoS) is defined as the ratio of
the social cost of the worst (respectively, best) NE solution and the corresponding
optimal social cost. There have been many studies such as [11, 15] and those we are
to mention below that use the PoA and the PoS to study NE solutions in scheduling
games. Heydenreich et al. [10] give a survey on the studies and Czumaj [5] gives
a survey on studies of different congestion models, to which scheduling games also
apply.
In the load balancing model, the utilitarian social cost of the total congestion
caused by all job agents can be interpreted as the total time spent by all jobs. To
the best of our knowledge, minimization of this social cost has not been considered
in the literature. However, similar social objectives have been considered recently.
Suri et al. [14] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [4] study the model where all
jobs are identical. The social cost they consider is the total latency in the system,
where the latency of each individual job is defined as a function of the number of jobs
assigned to a machine (or a route on a network) to which the job belong. Awerbuch
et al. [3] study the general case of the same model, i.e., jobs have different weights.
They consider linear and polynomial latency functions and define the social cost
as the sum of machine loads weighted by the latencies of the machines. Aland et
al. [1] provide exact bounds on the PoAs for the social cost of the total latency with
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polynomial latency functions. Gairing et al. [9] consider mixed strategies for the
same model and provide a bound on the PoA. Lu¨cking et al. [12] use as social cost
the sum of squared flows divided by capacities on the edges for routing games.
Fair cost sharing in network routing and design has been considered in [7, 2,
6]. For resource allocation games, Feldman and Tamir [8] recently introduce a
proportional cost-sharing scheme when machine activation cost is considered. The
social cost they consider is the maximum of individual costs. In this paper, we
extend this study to two new social objectives as mentioned above.
Model descriptions and main results
A set of jobs J = {1, 2, . . . , n} is to be assigned to a number of identical parallel
machines. Each job j ∈ J has a processing time (or weight) of pj > 0. For a
given job assignment A, we denote the set (respectively, number) of jobs assigned
to machine i by JA[i] (respectively, nAi ). The load of machine i under assignment
A is then LAi =
∑{pj : j ∈ JA[i]}. We omit the indication of A from the notation
unless there is a confusion. If the assignment A is optimal, we use J∗[i], n∗i and L∗i
to denote the above quantities, respectively.
In the load balancing model, we assume that there are fixed number m of ma-
chines. In this model, the cost to a job is the load of the machine the job is assigned
to. The social cost of a given overall job assignment is:
C1 =
m∑
i=1
niLi.
In the proportional cost-sharing model, let B denote the cost of activating each
machine. Given an overall job assignment, if job j with weight pj is assigned to
machine i of load Li, then its cost is
Li +
pj
Li
B,
where the first term is its congestion cost and the second term represents its share
of the cost of activating machine i, which is in proportion to its weight with respect
to the total weight of its machine. In this model, we consider two social costs:
C2 =
m∑
i=1
niLi +mB,
C3 = Lmax +mB,
wherem is the number of activated machines in the given job assignment and Lmax =
max1≤i≤m Li. As can be seen easily, the cost of C2 is the total of individual costs
of all jobs and C3 is the maximum congestion cost plus the sum of total activation
cost incurred in the system.
In each pi of the three problems defined above (pi = 1, 2, 3), we will use Cepi and
C∗pi to denote the social cost of an NE and an optimal solution, respectively. It is
convenient to partition all jobs into two categories, large and small: Jl = {j ∈ J :
pj > B} and Js = {j ∈ J : pj ≤ B}. Let P =
∑
j∈J pj and denote the minimum,
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average and maximum job weights respectively by pmin = minj∈J pj , pavg = P/n
and pmax = maxj∈J pj . Let
ρ1 = pavg/pmin,
ρ2 = B/max{pj : j ∈ Js},
ρ3 = B/pmin.
(1)
Clearly, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 ≥ 1 and ρ2 ≤ ρ3 whenever Js 6= ∅. In the next three sections, we
will establish the following three sets of main results.
In the load balancing model of social cost of C1 and the proportional cost-sharing
model with social costs of respective C2 and C3, we have the following respective
sets of bounds with all the upper bounds (asymptotically) tight:
ρ1 ≤ PoS ≤ PoA ≤ 1 + ρ1, (Theorem 2.1)
Ω( 3
√
ρ3) ≤ PoS ≤ PoA ≤ (ρ3 + 1)/(2√ρ2), (Theorem 3.1) PoA ≤
1
2
√
P
pmin
+O(1),
PoS ≤
√
P
B +O(1),
(Theorems 4.1 and 4.2)
where in the big O notation above, we assume B is fixed and pmax = O(
√
P ) if
P → +∞.
Notice that, for each of the three problems, the parametric bounds above show
that the PoS and hence the PoA can be very large if the parameters are not restricted.
2 Load balancing
We start with a direct observation of a simple property of NE assignments.
Lemma 2.1. Given any NE assignment, machine loads satisfy the following in-
equalities:
Li ≤ Lk + pj , ∀j ∈ J [i], 1 ≤ i, k ≤ m.
Lemma 2.1 simply means that, in any NE assignment, no job can reduce its cost
by unilaterally changing its machine. Using Lemma 2.1 we next prove an upper
bound on Ce1 .
Lemma 2.2. Given any NE assignment, its total cost Ce1 satisfies the following:
Ce1 =
m∑
i=1
niLi ≤
( n
m
+ 1
)
P.
Proof. For any fixed i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), we choose k and j in Lemma 2.1 such that
Lk = min
1≤k′≤m
Lk′ ≤ P
m
; and pj = min
j′∈J [i]
pj′ ≤ Li
ni
.
The two inequalities above are due to the facts that
m∑
i′=1
Li′ = P and
∑
j′∈J [i]
pj′ = Li; |J [i]| = ni.
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Therefore, we obtain
Li ≤ P
m
+
Li
ni
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
which leads directly to our conclusion.
The upper bound on Ce1 in Lemma 2.2 depends on the total processing time of
the jobs, the number of jobs and the number of machines. The following lemma is
a direct conclusion from the convexity of function f(x) = x2.
Lemma 2.3. For any real values x1, . . . , xm, we have
m∑
i=1
x2i ≥
1
m
(
m∑
i=1
xi
)2
.
With Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we can establish our first upper bound on PoA.
Theorem 2.1. Let ρ1 be defined as in (1). Then
ρ1 ≤ PoS ≤ PoA ≤ 1 + ρ1.
Proof. Fix any NE and optimal assignments. From Lemma 2.2 and the fact that
P =
∑
i L
∗
i ≤ C∗1 , we have
Ce1
C∗1
≤ 1 + n
m
P∑m
i=1 n
∗
iL
∗
i
.
With the following inequality
L∗i ≥ n∗i pmin,
and Lemma 2.3 and noticing that
∑m
i=1 n
∗
i = n, we get
Ce1
C∗1
≤ 1 + n
m
P
pmin
∑m
i=1(n
∗
i )2
≤ 1 + ρ1.
The following example provides the lower bound for the PoS.
Example 2.1. Consider an instance of m machines, m large jobs of unit processing
time and n small jobs of processing time 1/n. Assume that n > m and let n be a
multiple of m(m− 1).
Consider the assignment in which all large jobs are assigned to a single machine
and all small jobs are evenly assigned to the remaining machines. The social cost of
this assignment is an upper bound on the optimal social cost:
C∗1 ≤ m2 +
n
m− 1 .
Now consider the NE assignment A1 in which one large job and n/m small jobs are
assigned to each machine. The social cost of the assignment is
Ce1(A1) = (n+m)
m+ 1
m
.
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Then we get
Ce1(A1)
C∗1
≥ (n+m)(m+ 1)(m− 1)
m(m2(m− 1) + n) ,
which approaches m− 1/m as n→ +∞.
Now consider another NE assignment A2 in which two large jobs are assigned to
one of the machines, all small jobs are assigned to another machine, and one large
job is assigned to each of the remaining machines. The social cost of assignment A2
is
Ce1(A2) = (m+ n+ 2).
Therefore,
Ce1(A2)
C∗1
≥ (m+ n+ 2)(m− 1)
(m2(m− 1) + n)
which approaches m− 1 as n→ +∞.
There are no NE assignments other than the two given above, because in any
NE assignment, no more than two large jobs can be assigned to a single machine,
and no two machines can each receive two large jobs at the same time. It is easy to
see that Ce1(A1) > Ce1(A2) since n > m. In this example, we have
ρ1 =
(m+ 1)n
m+ n
which approaches (m + 1) as n → ∞. We can observe that with increased m both
Ce1(A1)/C∗1 and Ce1(A2)/C∗1 are bounded below by ρ1.
3 Cost sharing: Sum of loads
In the next two sections, we study proportional cost sharing model, in which each
machine used incurs an additional activation cost of B. Recall that Jl = {j ∈ J :
pj > B} and Js = {j ∈ J : pj ≤ B}. Soon we shall see that the problem becomes
trivial if all jobs are large: Js = ∅. For notational convenience and without loss of
generality, we will assume B = 1 in the remainder of the section, as we can achieve
this by dividing all processing times with the activation cost B.
It is easy to observe the following property of NE assignments for large jobs.
Lemma 3.1. Any large job will be assigned to a dedicated machine in any NE
assignment.
Similarly, the following lemma characterizes optimal assignments.
Lemma 3.2. In any optimal assignment, if L∗i > 1, then n
∗
i = 1.
Proof. Suppose that L∗i > 1 and n
∗
i ≥ 2. Let j ∈ J∗[i]. Then moving job j from
machine i to a dedicated machine will result in a new assignment with a reduced
objective value C ′2:
C ′2 − C∗2 = (1 + (ni − 1)(Li − pj) + 1 + pj)− (1 + niLi)
= 1− Li − (ni − 2)pj < 0,
which contradicts the optimality of the original schedule.
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Lemma 3.2 implies that an optimal assignment assigns all large jobs to dedicated
machines.
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 together imply that, if Js = ∅, then any NE assignment is
optimal and vice versa. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume Js 6= ∅ and
hence our definition of ρ2 in (1) is valid. On NE assignments of small jobs only, we
have
Lemma 3.3. For machines of small jobs, Li ≤ 1 holds in any NE assignment.
Proof. Suppose that Li > 1 holds for machine i. Consider job j on machine i. The
cost of job j is
Li +
pj
Li
.
If job j activates a new machine, its cost will be 1 + pj . Then the cost change is
∆ = 1 + pj − Li − pj
Li
= (1− Li) + pjLi − 1
Li
=
1− Li
Li
(Li − pj) < 0.
Lemma 3.3 implies that in an NE assignment, no machines other than dedicated
ones can have a load greater than 1. Given Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, let A =
∑
j∈Jl pj +|Jl| and denote ns = |Js|, we have the following result:
Lemma 3.4. Any NE assignment has a social cost Ce2 that is bounded above as
follows:
Ce2 ≤ ns + Ps +A.
Proof. Suppose that there are m activated machines in the NE assignment. Ac-
cording to Lemma 3.1, we assume that all small jobs are assigned to the first ms
machines. Then Li = 1− θi ≤ 1 for some θi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,ms. We have
Ce2 =
ms∑
i=1
(niLi + 1) +A =
ms∑
i=1
((ni − 1)Li + 1) + Ps +A
=
ms∑
i=1
((ni − 1)(1− θi) + 1) + Ps +A
= ns −
ms∑
i=1
(ni − 1)θi + Ps +A ≤ ns + Ps +A.
It is easy to see that the above bound is tight. On the other hand, we can provide
a lower bound on C∗2 .
Lemma 3.5. Any optimal assignment has a social cost C∗2 such that
C∗2 ≥ 2Ps
√
ρ2 +A.
7
Proof. Since n∗i ≥ ρ2L∗i , we have
C∗2 =
m∗s∑
i=1
n∗iL
∗
i +m
∗
s +A ≥
m∗s∑
i=1
ρ2L
∗
i
2 +m∗s +A.
Since
∑m∗s
i=1 L
∗
i = Ps, from Lemma 2.3 we have
∑m∗s
i=1 L
∗
i
2 ≥ P 2s /m∗s. Then,
C∗2 ≥ ρ2
P 2s
m∗s
+m∗s +A.
The fact that the right-hand side of the above inequality is at its minimum when
m∗s = Ps
√
ρ2 implies
C∗2 ≥ 2Ps
√
ρ2 +A.
With the above lemma, we are now able to establish our second main result.
Theorem 3.1. The PoS and PoA are bounded as follows:
Ω( 3
√
ρ3) ≤ PoS ≤ PoA ≤ ρ3 + 12√ρ2
(
≤ ρ3 + 1
2
)
.
Furthermore, the upper bound is tight.
Proof. Given the upper bound on Ce2 and the lower bound on C
∗
2 in Lemmas 3.4
and 3.5, respectively, noticing that ns ≤ ρ3Ps, we obtain
Ce2
C∗2
≤ ns + Ps +A
2Ps
√
ρ2 +A
≤ ρ3 + 1
2
√
ρ2
.
Since the above inequality holds for any instance, the upper bound in the theorem
is established. The tightness of the upper bound and the lower bound are shown in
the following two examples, respectively.
Example 3.1. Consider an instance of a2k jobs, each having a processing time 1
a2k
,
where a, k > 1 are fixed integers. An NE assignment is that all jobs are on a single
machine, which has the following social cost:
Ce2 = a
2k + 1.
It is easy to see that an optimal solution distributes all these identical jobs evenly
on all activated machines, i.e., |n∗u − n∗v| ≤ 1 for any two activated machines u, v.
Suppose that m machines are activated in a solution and there are equal numbers
of jobs on all these machines. Then the social cost of such a solution is
C2 = m+
a2k
m
1
a2k
a2k = m+
a2k
m
,
which is minimized if m∗ = ak. Hence, there exists an optimal solution with ak
machines activated of the following social cost:
C∗2 = 2a
k.
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Therefore, we conclude that
Ce2
C∗2
=
a2k + 1
2ak
=
ρ3 + 1
2
√
ρ2
,
which equals the upper bound in Theorem 3.1.
Example 3.2. Consider an instance of n+ 1 jobs (n ≥ 2) with machine activation
cost B = 1. The job processing times are pj = 1/n3 for j = 1, . . . , n and pn+1 =
1− 1/n2 − α with 0 < α ≤ 1/n2.
Let S be the assignment in which all jobs are assigned to the same machine, say
machine 1. Then L1 = 1− α, giving a social cost
C2(S) = n1L1 + 1 = (n+ 1)(1− α) + 1.
Proposition 1. S is the unique NE assignment.
Proof. S is an NE assignment since L1 < 1 so that no job can reduce its cost by
activating a new machine. We show that S is the unique NE assignment.
Claim 1. In any NE assignment with at least two activated machines, job n + 1
cannot have a dedicated machine.
Suppose that job n+1 is on a dedicated machine, say, machine 1. Then the cost
of job n+ 1 is
1− 1
n2
− α+ 1,
and L1 = pn+1. On the other hand, there is another machine i of load Li such that
1
n3
≤ Li ≤ 1
n2
. (2)
Then job n+ 1 would benefit by deviating from machine 1 to machine i since
Li +
pn+1
Li + pn+1
< 1, (3)
which can be easily verified by noticing that the LHS of inequality (3) is (a) convex in
Li and hence maximized at the end points of interval (2), and (b) strictly increasing
in pn+1, which is smaller than 1− 1/n2 < 1− 1/n3.
Claim 2. In any NE assignment with at least two activated machines, no small job
(of {1, . . . , n}) is assigned to the same machine with job n+ 1.
Suppose to the contrary that such NE assignment exists and a subset of small
jobs 1, . . . , n are on machine 1, which also contains job n + 1. Consider moving a
small job on machine 1 to another activated machine i. With the same argument
as in Claim 1 above we can see that the moving small job will benefit from such a
deviation, contradicting that the original assignment is an NE.
Claims 1 and 2 together imply that no NE assignment will activate more than
one machine, which proves our proposition.
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Let S∗ be the assignment in which machine 1 is dedicated to job n + 1 and
machine 2 accommodates all other jobs 1, ..., n. The social cost of S∗ is
C2(S∗) =
∑
i=1,2
niLi + 2 = 3 +
1
n
− 1
n2
− α.
Proposition 2. S∗ is an optimal assignment.
Proof. An assignment with at least three activated machines will have a social cost
more than 4− 1/n2 − α, which is greater than C2(S). On the other hand, C2(S) >
C2(S∗) since n ≥ 2 and α ≤ 1/n2.
Consequently, the lower bound on the PoS in Theorem 3.1 is implied by Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 and the fact that
C2(S)/C2(S∗) = Ω(n) = Ω( 3√ρ3), as n→∞.
4 Cost sharing: Maximum load
In this section, we consider minimizing social cost C3 = Lmax + mB, the sum of
maximum load in the system and the total machine activation cost. We first observe
a lower bound on the optimal social cost.
Lemma 4.1. Given any instance, the optimal social cost C∗3 ≥ 2
√
PB.
Proof. The social cost C3 of any assignment with m machines activated is
C3 ≥ P
m
+mB.
The RHS is minimized when the number of machines is m∗ =
√
P/B. Therefore,
the social cost of any optimal assignment is
C∗3 ≥
P√
P
B
+B
√
P
B
= 2
√
PB.
Now let us move on to considering NE assignments and establishing a relationship
between the machine loads and the number of jobs in any such assignment. The
following lemma says that, in an NE assignment, jobs of very small weights tend to
concentrate on machines of very small loads.
Lemma 4.2. In any NE assignment, if there are two non-empty machine loads Li1
and Li2 such that Li1 ≤ Li2 < 1kB for some integer k ≥ 1 , then there are at least k
jobs on machine i1.
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Proof. It is trivial if k = 1. Consider first that k = 2. Suppose to the contrary that
Li1 = pj for some job j. Then 0 < pj ≤ Li2 < B/2 implies that the cost for job j
will decrease if it migrates to machine i2:
pj
Li2 + pj
B + Li2 + pj < B + pj ,
a contradiction. Now assume that k ≥ 3. Let job j be the longest among all jobs on
machine i1. If there are at most k − 1 jobs on machine i1, then pj ≥ 1k−1Li1 , which
together with Li1 ≤ Li2 < 1kB implies that
pj
Li2 + pj
B + Li2 + pj <
pj
Li1
B + Li1 .
The above inequality again contradicts to the fact that the current assignment is an
NE.
Corollary 4.1. All but possibly one activated machine of small jobs will have a
load of at least
√
pminB.
Proof. The claim is trivial if pmin > B. Assume k =
√
B/pmin ≥ 1 (for simplicity
we assume k is an integer). Suppose to the contrary that we have two machines,
each of a load less than 1kB. Let L be the smaller load, which contains at least k
jobs according to Lemma 4.2. Hence,√
pminB > L ≥ kpmin,
which is a contradiction.
Theorem 4.1. Let pmax = O(
√
P ) and B be a fixed parameter. Then
PoA ≤ 1
2
√
P
pmin
+O(1).
The bound is tight.
Proof. If pmin > B, then all jobs are large and the above bound is easily derived
from Lemma 4.1 and the fact that each job occupies a dedicated machine in any NE
assignment according to Lemma 3.1, which is also applicable here as the objective
of individual jobs is the same. Therefore, we assume in the remaining proof that
pmin ≤ B.
From Corollary 4.1 we conclude that the number of machines activated in the
NE assignment is at most
Ps√
pminB
+ 1 + nl ≤ Ps√
pminB
+ 1 +
Pl
B
≤ P√
pminB
+ 1.
Therefore, with Lemma 4.1, we have
PoA ≤
(
P√
pminB
+ 1
)
B +max{B, pmax}
2
√
PB
=
1
2
√
P
pmin
+O(1).
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The tightness of the bound is demonstrated by the following example of n = k2 jobs
of length 1/k2 each for some large integer k ≥ 2 and B = 1. It is easy to check that
the assignment of k jobs to each of k machines is an NE and the optimal assignment
is to activate only one machine. Therefore, the NE cost and optimal cost are k+1/k
and 2, respectively, giving a ratio of k/2 + 1/(2k) = 12
√
P
pmin
+O(1).
The tight upper bound on the PoA in Theorem 4.1 is proportional to
√
P . We
will establish a similar bound for the PoS. Let us start with a special NE assignment.
Lemma 4.3 ([8]). If P > B then there always exists an NE assignment in which
Li1 + Li2 > B for any pair {i1, i2} of activated machines.
Such an NE assignment as stated in the above lemma can be constructed by
an algorithm based on LPT [8]. Lemma 4.3 immediately leads to the following
observation.
Lemma 4.4. There exists an NE for which m < 2P/B.
Similar to Theorem 4.1, we have the following theorem for the PoS.
Theorem 4.2. As in Theorem 4.1, let pmax = O(
√
B) and B be a fixed parameter.
Then
PoS ≤
√
P
B
+O(1).
The bound is tight.
Proof. Denote by Ce3 the social cost of an NE assignment such that it satisfies the
condition in Lemma 4.4. Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 together with Lemma 4.4 imply
Ce3 ≤ max{pmax, B}+ 2P,
which in turn along with Lemma 4.1 implies that
Ce3
C∗3
≤ max{pmax, B}+ 2P
2
√
PB
=
√
P
B
+O(1),
from which the upper bound in the theorem follows with the definition of the PoS.
The following example shows the tightness of the bound.
Example 4.1. Consider an example with n jobs, each having a length of 1/2+1/n.
Suppose that B = 1. Then, the only possible NE solution is to assign each job to
a different machine, which gives Ce3 = n + 1/2 + 1/n. As n increases, C
e
3 and C
∗
3
approach 2P and 2
√
P , respectively, and hence the PoS approaches
√
P .
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5 Concluding remarks
A natural measure for the efficiency of NE solutions is the utilitarian social cost,
i.e., the sum of individual cost. In this paper, we have considered such social cost
for two models, one of which is the classical machine load balancing and the other
is the proportional cost sharing. For the latter model, we have also considered an
egalitarian cost Lmax +mB. We have shown that, for each of the three problems,
NE solutions can be arbitrarily worse than the optimal social costs. On the other
hand, we have also provided a tight parametric upper bound on the PoA in each
case. Our work fills a gap in the literature in the well studied load balancing game
and extends the results to the proportional cost-sharing games recently introduced.
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